oris Pasternak, in "Translating Shakespeare," speaks of Hamlet as one whom chance has allocated "the role of judge of his own times and servant of the future," the high destiny of "a life devoted ... to a heroic task."
NATURE REVALUED: THE PHILOSOPHY OF PURPOSIVE BEING
Jonas begins his substantive speculations and the crucial philosophic rehabilitation of nature by returning to human subjectivity its own self-validating credentials (64) (65) . We are what we seem. Philosophically, this means taking the inner testimony of our subjective life seriously. This specifically entails recognizing the circumscribed potency of subjectivity and crediting the reality of efficacious purposes in determining autonomous trains of thought and bodily activities.
Moreover, in philosophical speculation we must bow before well-established scientific and empirical facts. Minds or subjectivity are nowhere found independent of physical, organic bodies. In fact, we know directly from inner experience that the activities of mind are impossible without our bodies and the surrounding world. The mind lives off the primary objects of its thoughts, the world abroad, and the interests and emotions arising from the worldly involved organism. In short, if we were not biological organisms, we would and could not be efficaciously purposive subjects or minds.
Further, we know and must take seriously the now incontrovertible fact that all organic life has evolved out of and remains within nature. This fact, coupled with the ultimate organic and worldly grounds of all subjective and mental activities, blocks the serious entertainment of dualistic theses and the intrusion of mind, subjectivity, or soul from some anatural elsewhere (66-67).
Philosophically we can no longer accept anatural or antinatural ontological principles. We are all, or should be, post-Darwinian, scientists and philosophers alike. In any case, radical Cartesian dualisms and their like have always been hounded by fatal flaws of incoherence or inconsistency, the problem of bringing dual features of reality-for example, mind and body-rationally together. Things fundamentally or substantially dissimilar do not easily fit into a single scheme of things. The urge toward a philosophic "monism" that respects the full diversity and complexity of the real has always been the more rationally attractive option.
Jonas explicitly adheres to this rational desire to weave a coherent story of man and nature. He starts with the self-evident and widely attested fact of man's subjective potency and employs an eminently sensible philosophic method. Whereas science reduces natural phenomena to their underlying physical causes, which "explain" them scientifically (the "reductionist method"), philosophy in its "interpretation" of concrete nature must work regressively (69 ff.). If man is thoroughly a natural and organic being, and if man exhibits the reality of effective purposes, then purposiveness must be a fundamental principle of reality, reigning in various degrees of intensity throughout nature, as intertwined with "physical" or efficient causation. Nature manifestly shows itself in man, and we must "work back" from the evidence of ourselves.
Human interests, aims (purposes), feelings (emotions), thinking, and bodily activities are all intertwined natural principles and as such can be judiciously or critically employed in philosophically interpreting, if not scientifically explaining, the natural realm (71-72).
In sum, these characteristic human features naturally result from and are ongoingly involved in the dynamics of the natural All purpose, subjectivity, and value were banished from nature into mind. Nature was left valueless and dead, a mere play of mechanical forces or efficient causation.
realm. Using the regressive method and brooking no radical leaps or discontinuities in nature (philosophic monism requires such a principle of continuity [69]), we are rationally justified in asserting that effective purposiveness is a fundamental feature of natural being. This is decisive. This basic assertion underlies Jonas's bold and original speculative philosophy. The philosophic interpretation of the world and ourselves undergoes a systematic sea change.
Most fundamentally, nature is rehabilitated as a significant realm of existence. It is a realm that harbors its own overall value and specific concrete values, its own intrinsic goodness, and its own "ends-in-themselves" (80 ff.). The materialist's nature, we recall, is inherently valueless, a mere dynamic concatenation of blind physical forces, in which there is no true subjectivity or activity. It is merely and contingently there, indifferent to itself. With respect to value, it is indistinguishable from nothingness or nonbeing. ontologically harboring intrinsic "value-in-itself" and "goodness-in-itself" (81, 83).
These philosophic reflections and speculations bring us directly to our contemporary cultural and ethical situation. The ontological facts and achieved results of purposive nature and our natural estate determine both the capacity and the need for ethical responsibility. 3 We now urgently require a substantive philosophy to reveal and to clarify our objective obligations.
In us, purposive nature has potentially overrun herself (138).
The vulnerability and finitude of nature and ourselves-with the threats to nature's goodness and intrinsic worth that issue from newly empowered, technological man-must be met by our aboriginal but circumscribed powers to say no to not-being (139-40). In an indifferent nature, nothing can harm, and nothing can be harmed.
NATURE AND ETHICS: THE THEORY OF RESPONSIBILITY
This means that, ontologically, intrinsic value, goodness, and "ends-in-themselves" are not inherently tied to human subjectivity or consciousness. In varying degrees, they are spread throughout nature, most emphatically in the organic realm of life and perhaps minimally beyond. This blocks any overweening anthropocentric vision of the world and philosophically establishes the objective status of intrinsic values, the good, and self-justifying natural beings and activities. The realm of value no longer threatens to be swallowed up and lost in an arbitrary human subjectivity or will radically independent of the natural world.
Correlatively, with our anchoring in natural reality, we are enlightened about our status in the scheme of things and about our circumscribed powers and inherent limitations. In Jonas's monistic vision, we are interpreted as purposive nature's most elaborate performance, engendered in its dynamic ongoingness. In us, efficacious purposiveness has become emphatically subjective and individual, conscious and desiring of itself, moving decisively beyond organic others (129). In our interdependence, in our essential relations with nature and our own human past, present, and future, we have become nature's most significant actors. We are purposive nature become cultural, political, scientific, technological, artistic, religious, philosophical, and moral. But all these decidedly human powers and characteristics are circumscribed and limited. They have not flown in from elsewhere, with an adequacy and sufficiency all their own.
They are the issue of the slow evolutionary workings of nature, of which we more and more have become an active agent (27).
Powers of sensory discrimination, emotion, thought, and bodily activity have evolved to meet worldly necessities and to take advantage of worldly opportunities. No powers have been greater than the sustained emotional interest, the vivid imagination, and the conceptual thought that are the natural dynamos behind our science and technology. But even here we remain nature's creatures, plagued and perhaps blessed by mortality, finitude, and vulnerability. We are neither gods nor angels. Jonas emphasizes that we are by nature better equipped to perceive error than to discover final truth, to recognize an imposing malum than to ascertain clearly the summum bonum (27). Life more or less lives straightforwardly until pressed. Scientific, philosophic, and moral insight are born as much from worldly crisis as from indwelling eros and are always "unfinished."
The key to the objective grounding of obligations and the moving of ethics beyond the bounds of the arbitrary subjective will of man is to discover intrinsic value or a final "good-in- In this necessary truck with the world abroad, an organism's purposes can be frustrated and its achievements destroyed, most importantly its own active endeavor to be. To gain entrance into the worldly web of purposive existence is to assume a circumscribed potency constantly threatened and eventually overcome.
In short, the fundamental value and goodness of nature active and its inherent vulnerability are intrinsically tied together.
To the fundamental value and goodness of nature active and its inherent vulnerability are intrinsically tied together.
which
This primordial "ontological ought" becomes a "moral ought" in the worldly situation in which we find ourselves (80 ff.).
Naturally purposive beings, who "ought-to-be" and who are intrinsically finite and vulnerable, come within the reaches of our human power (92 ff.). We can affect them for better or for worse; we can wrong or harm them or benefit and allow them to pursue. Moreover, we are aware of our power and responsibility to do what sustains the good of vulnerable life. In virtue of our native, worldly powers of controlled action, knowing, and circumscribed freedom, the "ought-to-be" of the vulnerable ones becomes the "ought-to-do" of ourselves (89, 93, 129 ff.).
Natural being significantly determines human moral action.
The feeling of objective obligations to valuable and vulnerable others is the feeling of responsibility, for which nature has prepared us in the intimate family relation of parent and child (85, 95). The newly born needy one, instinct with purposive life and human capacities to come, ever threatened with nonbeing, addresses those who brought it into existence with the "demand"
for care (134). To respond to the insistent demand that issues from the newborn is to act responsibly. Not to do so is to be irresponsible. Over this natural responsibility, there is no choice. In sum, the objective goodness of things that "ought-to-be" should determine our subjective moral life, our "ought-to-feel,"
"ought-to-think," and "ought-to-do"-a harmony of objective and subjective being prepared for us, if imperfectly, by nature.
Jonas squarely faces both the goodness of life and the world and our own potentialities for good and evil. He unsentimentally
This paradigm of responsibility for our own offspring is the model for the responsibility for the care of all of life and nature.
accepts and affirms the metabolic rigors of organic being, that life must use life in order to be itself (131). He recognizes the goodness of finitude and mortality, of purposive being ever be- Jonas argues in terms of bonum and malum, "good" and "bad,"
as they are discovered in worldly experience and in terms of the moral responses and principles that these discoveries of goodness engender. He eschews the more abstract, theory-laden language of "interests" and "rights" favored by consequentialists [utilitarians] and deontologists, respectively.) All these "worldly facts" are recognized as there in experience prior to philosophic intervention. They are not created or freely constructed by theoretical imagination. It is the business of human language and theory to gather these fundaments of human reality and experience into explicit, conscious attention and to express their nature and interconnections adequately. This is the task of speculative philosophy. The task is not to create a thought-world prior to and ungrounded in experience.
Critics might charge Jonas with indulging in an unwarranted and delusive "intuitionism." What Jonas has found, he has put there, according to such critics. Philosophy and all theories are artifacts, through and through conventional or cultural constructs. Any connections to experience are thoroughly mediated and transformed by language and prior conceptions.
In my judgment, this charge is both unfair and begs the question of the fundamental philosophic issue at hand, namely, our deep rootedness in experience, organic being, and the world. Jonas can offer no guarantee of his ontological reading of experience and of the final adequacy of his ethical theory.
Both are always open to reconsideration and to a philosophic reexamination of experience. Indeed, with his emphasis on "purposiveness" one can ask whether he has downplayed or submerged the ontological and ethical significance of concrete form, wholeness, and integrity, both organic and subjective.
But to damn Jonas's enterprise from the start is to take a stand within a rival philosophic position that is itself suspect, most especially if it denies the validity of firsthand experience.
In sum, the ultimate importance of The Imperative of Responsibility may be in restoring a circumspect and judicious confidence in the firsthand deliverances, ontological and ethical, of our worldly experience. We should be more on guard against abstract, imperious, and intolerant theories than against the rich texture and complexities of the primary experiential evidence of ourselves and the world. This freedom from the hegemony of theory allows us once again to pursue philosophy seriously. 
NOTES

